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Ereignis; the precondition for Being and Time – a premonition

	To understand Heidegger, arguably the most significant philosopher of the past century, we need an overview, what Wittgenstein called a perspicuous representation (Wittgenstein, 1984, #122).  Philosophers have sought to understand Heidegger in terms of his “one great idea” - being, it is now time to understand him with respect to his second great idea - Ereignis.1 This is especially true since many have yet to understand his first great idea; maybe the second will help to elucidate the first.  Just as Heidegger advised Richardson to understand his early thought in terms of what comes later; “But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II” (Richardson, 1963, p.xxii); so too must we understand being from the perspective of Ereignis.2 To do so we must not only elucidate these terms but also fit them into a discourse that encompasses the entire horizon of Heidegger’s work.  And that means understanding the turn in his thinking; orientating ourselves by means of the turn.





	With so many difficult interrelated problems let us begin at the end and take a somewhat circuitous route back to the beginning.  Much has been made of Heidegger’s reference to “the end of philosophy” but few have realised that by ‘end’ Heidegger did not mean completion, as though the problems of philosophy had received their final solution or dissolution.  End means limit and thus can also mean beginning, origin.  In “The end of philosophy and the task of thinking”, an important essay written in 1964 in which Heidegger looks back over his career, we are left with many clear hints as to the changes that occurred in his thinking;

The old meaning of the word “end” means the same as place: “from one end to the other” means from one place to the other.  The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy’s history is gathered in its uttermost possibility” (Heidegger, 1993, p.433).

And we are also warned;

“Or is there a first possibility for thinking apart from the last possibility that we characterized [the dissolution of philosophy into the technologized sciences], a possibility from which the thinking of philosophy would have to start, but which as philosophy it could nevertheless not expressly experience and adopt” (Heidegger, 1993, p.435)?

Could it be that the end of philosophy is fundamentally the same as its beginning?  What is this first possibility for thinking and why is it that philosophy does not have unhindered access to its origin?  Could it be that in order to apply the postmetaphysical we must first enter into the premetaphysical?  And what would this involve?  And where would this lead?  Is a new beginning possible?  And how about its end?  Why must philosophy be abandoned?  And must philosophy be equated with metaphysics?

	On numerous occasions throughout Heidegger’s oeuvre he informs us; “The beginning already contains the end latent within itself” (Heidegger, 1971, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, p.76). 3 In the infamous “Rectoral Address” he elaborates upon this idea;

“The beginning still is.  It does not lie behind us, as something that was long ago, but stands before us.  As what is greatest, the beginning has passed in advance beyond all that is to come and thus also beyond us.  The beginning has invaded our future.  There it awaits us, a distant command bidding us catch up with its greatness” (Heidegger, 1985, p.473).

It is common knowledge that the origin of Western philosophy is to be found in the ancient Greeks.  Plato has Socrates say to Theatetus; “For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else.”4 A position reiterated by Aristotle; “For it is precisely through wonder that people today and at the beginning began to philosophise.”5 Wonder leads one to describe explain and predict, not only to do philosophy but also to amass scientific knowledge.  For the Greeks there was no distinction between philosophy and science.  Thus we should not be surprised that the enterprise of philosophy results in the domination of the sciences.  The first beginning is characterised by a seeking for the being of beings, for the overarching principle or ground for all existence.

	Even though no satisfactory principle or ground was ever found (although many have acted as though they knew the answer and some may still believe that the answer is to be found by faith in the existence of God, others in confidence that science can answer all questions), the history of philosophy can be seen as such a seeking.  As such, a wonder of the hidden and mysterious haunts philosophy.  Philosophy is haunted by wonder but wonder has abandoned it, left it to its half-truths and fabricated facts and subjective interpretations.  Wonder motivates philosophy, it is the effective power behind all striving for knowledge and truth but it is no longer active.  Wonder is dissipating.  Religious Fundamentalism strangles wonder and as thought has attempted to mirror mathematical proof our confidence in science has grown to the point where we expect answers will be found and no longer question.  Nihilism sets in and enframes all thought.  Whatever meaning is left to us appears as a forgery.

	Even the realisation of this haunting (of philosophy by wonder) would be seen as superstition and thus avoided from the perspective of science.  But if the truth be known, it is nihilism that makes a bogeyman out of the mysterious by trivializing it, and thus, by attempting to disallow a rival, creates a phantasm.  Now the only place left for wonder is science, but it is a deformed and diluted sense of wonder, a mixture of curiosity and marvel based upon the known and knowable not the unknown and unknowable as was the wonder of the first beginning of philosophy. When the sense of the unknown and unknowable is lost, science moves away from philosophy towards nihilism.

	The fight against nihilism would lead one to retreat back to the origin of philosophy, to attempt a reawakening of wonder.  But it is not enough to attempt a repetition of the first beginning.  We must learn from the historical path philosophy took from wonder to nihilism and not merely repeat it.  A new beginning must be instigated.  And this is what Heidegger sought in his later philosophy; to not only ask the guiding question of philosophy – how does it stand with beings? – but to ask the grounding question – how does it stand with being?;

To ask "How does it stand with being?" means nothing less than to recapture, to repeat, the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning.  This is possible.  It is indeed the crucial form of history, because it begins in the fundamental event.  But we do not repeat a beginning by reducing it to something past and now known, which need merely be imitated; no, the beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that attend a true beginning (Heidegger, 1987, p.39).





	When Heidegger thought through the origin and end of philosophy he fixated upon place and culture, as though the origin of philosophy was not just accidentally Greek but essentially Greek and the end of philosophy was not just accidentally German but necessarily German.  This is troublesome, it surely leads to the charge of anthropology that Heidegger always sought to avoid.6

	Here we will attempt to discuss these matters in a way which is ahistorical and unaffected by the bias of humanism.  In other words, we will attempt to remain true to Heidegger’s intention if not his practice.  What this means is that the power of a beginning or end lies in its possibility rather than actuality, in its ability to allow an unfolding of possibilities and not just to instigate a particular future out of a particular rendition of the past.  This is not to deny that all theory is dependent upon a historical and sociological context, rather it is to denounce the reading of such theory back into the pretheoretical.  This is also to reject what Karl Popper called Historicism – determinism better captures the notion – that crystal ball gazing that scholars turn to when they become over-confident.

When Heidegger foresaw the need for a new beginning he sought inspiration from the poetry of Hölderlin and the philosophy of Nietzsche to get underway.  But surely a new beginning must reawaken the force of the first beginning while avoiding any taint of its mistakes.  Hölderlin’s poetry is mesmerized by the Greeks, Catholicism and German patriotism.  An unlikely mix to use to avoid metaphysics and nihilism.  And Nietzsche’s philosophy is so anti-Platonism, anti-Christianity and anti-Germanic that Heidegger argues (convincingly) that it fails to overcome metaphysics;

The pronouncement “God is dead” means: The suprasensory world is without effective power.  It bestows no life.  Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end.  Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the countermovement to metaphysics, and that means for him a movement in opposition to Platonism.
	Nevertheless, as a mere countermovement it necessarily remains, as does everything “anti”, held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves (Heidegger, 1977, “The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead””, p.61).

	Is it the combination of these two German intellectual luminaries, the traditional poet and the radical thinker, that is to somehow combine to inspire a new beginning?  Did Heidegger see himself as such a hybrid?

	Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) is the work where Heidegger first intentionally prepares and attempts to put into practice this new beginning.  Unlike Heidegger’s other works, Contributions was written as a private journal, a workbook unmeant for publication.  It is an attempt to instigate a new way of thinking and speaking about being.  The work consists of eight parts; a preview, six interwoven sections which make up the body of the text and a final section which is more an overview than a conclusion.7  The six parts which make up the body of the text – ‘Echo’, ‘Playing-Forth’, ‘Leap’, ‘Grounding’, ‘The Ones to Come’ and ‘The Last God’ –  are to be understood as interwoven, as intimating one another, as a combined attempt to show be-ing;8

What is said is inquired after and thought in the “playing-forth” unto each other of the first and the other beginning, according to the “echo” of be-ing in the distress of being’s abandonment, for the “leap” into be-ing, in order to “ground” its truth, as a preparation for “the ones to come” and for “the last god” (Heidegger, 1999, p.6).

These last two sections clearly invoke Nietzsche and Hölderlin yet they are the most unsatisfactory of the work as they are too short and undeveloped.

	But is this not true of the majority of Heidegger’s work?  Books and lecture courses abandoned or cut short litter his early stage; hints and gestures left unsatisfactorily explicated predominate in his later period.  This is not to deny the importance of the problems seen and developed and the originality and brilliance of so much of Heidegger’s philosophizing.  When it comes to completing a project, Heidegger hesitates, he cannot bring himself to a conclusion.  Instead he re-evaluates and begins again.  Is this a mark of the temperament of the thinker or the nature of the problems he dealt with?  Most likely a combination of both.  What is inspirational in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) is its attempt to speak from being and to leave beings alone; what is disappointing is that it assumes to have succeeded.

	Metaphysics with its way of thinking and speaking solely in terms of beings must be replaced by a way of thinking and speaking which is attuned to being or the possibility of being.  The failure of the first beginning must instigate the other beginning, a beginning which carries all the evocative force of the first beginning but does not allow it to peter out exclusively as fuel to be burnt for the making and sustaining of beings.  The other beginning must be self-sustaining - true to being.

This new beginning with its new way of thinking and speaking can be seen in Heidegger’s reference to the turn (Kehre).  Rather than seeing the turn as an historical event in Heidegger’s development, one should think of turning as a way of thinking in tune with being which gives perspective, allows circumspection and orientates all understanding.9  Turning is letting go (Gellassenheit) and keeping silent, i.e. running counter to the predominant focus upon beings and the ego and instead allowing being to unfold and flourish and reveal or conceal itself as it reveals or conceals beings.

	Both the reflection on the first beginning and the founding of its end, an end equal to it and to its greatness, belong together in the turning (Heidegger, 1994, p.110).





With Ereignis Heidegger has sublated (Aufhebung) being and time, seeing their mutual dependence, the impossibility of their independence, and thus transgressed their boundaries.  Ereignis is the happening of being, the unfolding of being, the temporalizing of being, the turning of thought.  As such Ereignis is prior to and transcends both being and time.  Ereignis captures the “and” of “being and time”.

Heidegger shows the possibility of an understanding of Ereignis (enowning) from out of an understanding of the Ge-stell (enframing) of modern technology:

An excellent way of approaching enowning would be to look into the essence of enframing, insofar as it is a passage from metaphysics to another thinking (“a Janus head” it is called in On Time and Being), for enframing is essentially ambiguous.10

Because we are so entranced by science and the achievements of technology and see all problems in their terms, it becomes obvious that being has abandoned us.  Either we rest content in this way of seeing and dealing, perceiving and conceiving everything or we abandon it and look for another way:  But either way we are still caught, determined by, Ge-stell:

“But where danger is, grows the saving power also” Hölderlin.

In an important passage also in On Time and Being Heidegger reveals how Ereignis stands outside of being and time and must be thought in terms of concealment rather than unconcealment;

With the entry of thinking into Ereignis, its own way of concealment proper to it also arrives.  Ereignis is in itself expropriation [Ewnt-eignis].  This word contains in a manner commensurate with Ereignis the early Greek lēthē in the sense of concealing.11

But how does one think and speak in terms of concealment?  A way needs to be found even in the dark.

Ereignis can also be understood as the precondition for an understanding of both being and time and their relationship in terms of the shift in Heidegger’s thought from the meaning of being to the truth of being, the history of being, the topology of being and the language of being.  But ‘truth’, ‘history’, ‘topology’ and ‘language’ must here be understood outside of metaphysics, away from the taint of human subjectivity and its corresponding objectivism.  We must think beyond the subject\object dichotomy and embrace the unity of the cosmos of which we are the microcosm (Wittgenstein12).  But a microcosm whose story is also the story of being.

The narrative begins from a new place; actually it is no place (utopia) as it is outside of metaphysical conceptions because it is starting further back.  All we can possibly have is a premonition of where and how to begin originally and what it means to start with Ereignis.  Anything more than a premonition would be to rely upon an instantiation or an understanding which can only occur out of metaphysics and its corollary epistemology.  These two always go hand in hand, insinuating and insinuated by one another making the mess which often is what passes for philosophy.

To start further back would be to abandon all the methods that philosophy has adopted.  One could not begin with a theory – description alone would be allowable (Wittgenstein13).  But not in Wittgenstein’s sense of description because what we would need is not reliance upon everyday usage of words but rather an unfolding of the meaning of the fundamental words of philosophy and reaching back to their nonphilosophical beginnings.  Not in terms of use but in terms of depth of potential meaning – premonition - would we have to begin:

“Lightning bolt strikes and all is revealed” Heraclitus.





What if to truly understand anything is to understand it in terms of its opposite, or better its nonpossibility, that from which it arises prior to its presence?  We now consider life sacred but prior to this and instantiating it was the practice of sacrifice.  In order to sacrifice life cannot be sacred but rather becomes sacred through the ritual.  We focus upon the said not silence, upon thought not what is unthinkable, upon explanation not mystery.

We will now look at the four major areas of philosophy in these terms: ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of language.  Ethics begins with the ethos of virtue ethics but ends with the impersonal lack of character in the focus upon rules and consequences, objectivity and relativity.  Ethics begins with ethos but ends in the mores of morality.  The expression of character is honesty – truth in human terms.

Honesty arises out of innocence, the lack of guile – prior to guilt and shame – prior to the knowledge of good and evil – prior to the intelligence to question which comes with maturity and the possibility of choosing between competing opinions.  Honesty depends upon the oblivion (lethe) of ignorance.

	Metaphysics as the study of what exists, substance and the properties proper to it, the interplay of existentia and essentia, leads inexorably to the domination of scientific method, the enframing of Gestell and the meaninglessness of nihilism.  But metaphysics begins with wonder, with being entranced by the world as it presences itself to us, with us, through us – metaphysics begins with the mystery of why there is something rather than nothing (Leibniz).  The world is but “Nature loves to hide” (Heraclitus) – truth as unconcealment (aletheia).

	The world surrounds us and intimidates us with its grandeur and alterity, the excess of presence – after fear and anxiety – after the attunement to the logos and public opinion – after the ability to act on our desires which ultimately rule everything that we do.  The world depends upon the primordiality of earth.
	Epistemology assumes and presumes direct access to the truth in terms of the correctness of what is thought and said.  We only exhume that which we already know, that which we are comfortable with, the rest we pass over as irrelevant or we turn away from it pretending it is not there (things in themselves (Kant)); we flee from what is too much to comprehend and thus we flee from each other and ourselves.  The expedition is taken in solitude and that is its fundamental error – our historicity and communality are denied and with them any possibility of learning.  “Knowledge is virtue” (Socrates) and thus fundamentally ethical, knowledge is being-with and being-worlded and thus fundamentally metaphysical – truth as being-situated (Da-sein).
	To be human is to be responsible, for others as well as oneself – with justice (δίκη) and equity (Μοϊρα) – with the authenticity which comes from identifying with who one has been and who one may become (ευδαϊμοηια) – with the wisdom that comes from learning from mistakes.  To be human is to be determined by place but to find oneself (Befindlichkeit) homeless (utopia).
	The philosophy of language analyses and dissects words and grammar, its tools are linguistics and logic and it mistakes its tools for its workspace.  Language is seen as fundamentally simple, as obvious, as something we already know and do not need to elaborate upon.  Much like Heidegger’s hammer, we only notice it when it is needed but broken or lost – when the words cannot capture what needs to be expressed.  We focus upon languages and ignore language; we focus upon reference and ignore meaning and when we finally do turn our attention to meaning we then ignore meaningfulness.  A word or phrase can only have meaning if it is meaningful in a language, in language - in a life, in a culture, in a history, in the cosmos.  Not truth as correctness nor “Truth as error” (Nietzsche) – truth as language.  (Not “Language is the house of being” (Heidegger) - language is being.)
	To be meaningful is to count, to take account of and to hold oneself to account (logos) – when one is all (hen panta) and all is the same (ta auto) – when rationality is a gift rather than a possession – when all that one is comes from others.  To be meaningful is to be limited yet determined by the unlimited (apeiron).
	The four major areas – ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of language - interact and interanimate with one another.  As Wittgenstein said;
These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each.14
We cannot conceive of one without conceiving of the others, to even attempt to do so would be an injustice, their problems as real problems are all-consuming.
‘Philosophy’ itself, said to have been coined like the word ‘cosmos’ by Pythagoras, is etymologically interpreted as the love or friend of wisdom but if we remain true to Pythagorean thought it would be better to understand it as attunement (balance and harmony) to wisdom (deeper insights of the cosmos).  With such an understanding in hand one realises that one cannot ever be content with one’s knowledge or one’s achievements but must continually strive to better oneself, the lot of others and the well-being of the world.




	In attempting to go forward we find ourselves once again facing backwards: How small is the circle? What does it take to create a new circle? 15
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1.  Being will not be capitalized as has become standard practice in English.  Being is not a noun and the context should be sufficient to distinguish between the many senses of being.  I also prefer not to translate key philosophical terms such as Ereignis, especially because the word attempts to invoke something completely new, something that comes out of the other beginning after the turn has been taken. Translations such as ‘event’, ‘event of appropriation’, ‘appropriation’, ‘propriation’, ‘happening’ or ‘enowning’, although they each have their merits, overly limit the scope of the word and fail to capture the yet unforeseen mystery. The word should invoke (depending upon context) such meanings as happening, owning and seeing, to various degrees and in various combinations. It is hard to tell whether Heidegger uses ‘Ereignis’ as a new word for being, as a replacement for being, or as the essence of being (recall that Heidegger invoked the same confusions when he translated aletheia as both truth and the essence of truth – unconcealment). And what happens to Ereignis when being is placed under erasure - being? If it is felt that a translation is necessary, then I would rather the reader heard “what allows for premonition and brings what happens to pass” rather than one of the other variants of the meaning of Ereignis.
2.  Theodore Kisiel has argued (in conversation) that Ereignis is used very early by Heidegger and should not be understood as a new element in his later thinking but rather as an idea present and unfolding from the beginning. I agree in fact but have to admit to being sceptical of whether such exegesis can capture the subtleties of Heidegger’s later philosophy - changes of context entail changes of meaning and as the meaning of being changes the meaning of Ereignis is also transformed.
3.  See also for example Heidegger, 1994, p.110 and Heidegger, 1999, p.13 (both these citations are quoted later on in the paper).
4.  Plato, 155 D 2ff.
5.  Aristotle, A 2, 982b 11ff.
6.  Such cultural specification is troublesome and mirrors the issues surrounding what W.V.O. Quine termed the indeterminacy of translation.  It was Edmund Husserl who criticised Being and Time for being too anthropological.
7.  It should be known that this last section ‘Be-ing’ originally followed the ‘Preview’; the editors of the Gesamtausgabe placed it at the end of the work due to a note from Heidegger, “’Be-ing’ as Section II is not correctly arranged; as an attempt to grasp the whole once again, it does not belong at this juncture.”  But it is questionable whether Heidegger meant this section to be the final section, especially when one recalls the two- part ‘Introduction’ to Being and Time which served as an overview to prepare the reader for what was to come.  Wherever ‘Be-ing’ should be placed it is clear that Heidegger was not completely happy with it (nor with the work as a whole).  
8.  ‘Be-ing’ is the English translators’ rendition of ‘Seyn’, an old German spelling that Heidegger uses to avoid the common understanding of ‘Sein’ as beingness.
9. In attempting to place Heidegger's turn it is surprising that commentators ignore Heidegger's testimony; “The matter thought in the term "reversal" was already at work in my thinking ten years prior to 1947” (Richardson, 1963, p.xvi).  1947 was the year of publication of Heidegger's "Letter on humanism" in which he first referred to a reversal in his thinking.  Notice that Heidegger did not say 'seventeen years' which would date the turn at 1930 with the lecture "On the essence of truth".  Hannah Arendt has argued that the turn in Heidegger's thinking occurred due to the influence of Nietzsche and can be seen in the change of style between the first and second volumes of Heidegger's Nietzsche, which would place it at 1939.  See Arendt, 1978, pp.172-3.
10.  Heidegger, 2003, “Seminar in Le Thor 1969”, p. 60.  The relevant passage cited is Heidegger, M, 1972, p.53.
11.  Heidegger, 1972, p.41.
12.  Wittgenstein, 1961, #5.63 “I am my world.  (The microcosm.)”
13. Wittgenstein, 1958, #109 “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.”
14. Wittgenstein, 1958, #96.
15.  This paper is a precursor to an attempt at a new philosophical approach which will be outlined in a paper titled “Terminology – the Philosophical Unity of Language, People, Place and Time.”
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